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Introduction 
The dominant interpretation of sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution holds 
that the National Congress consciously opted for national sovereignty as opposed 
to popular sovereignty. Followers of this interpretation argue that direct consul-
tation of the people – most notably through referendums – is unconstitutional. 
Giving voice to the nation through legal decision-making is reserved exclusively 
for political representatives. Yet, it has been shown elsewhere that the national 
sovereignty interpretation is an anachronism (De Smaele, 2005; Deseure, 2016b; 
Geenens and Sottiaux, 2015). This chapter traces the development of the closely 
related subjects of sovereignty and referendums in Belgian constitutional doctrine 
from 1831 onwards. We will chart the different points of view on sovereignty 
from the nineteenth century until the definite breakthrough of the national sov-
ereignty interpretation between 1893 and 1950, as well as the implications this 
development had for the perceived (un)constitutionality of referendums. We will 
also briefly address the more recent (post-2000) debates on citizen participation 
and their connection to the issue of sovereignty. 
Our central claim is that there is not one well-defined, stable sovereignty 
interpretation which undergirds the Belgian Constitution. Instead, sovereignty 
has been defined and redefined on several occasions under the influence of soci-
etal circumstances and in service to political goals. Three major fields of conflict 
have subsequently shaped Belgian constitutional doctrine on sovereignty: (1) the 
rivalry between Catholics and liberals; (2) the rise of – and resistance to – eman-
cipatory movements, including socialism; and (3) the post–Second World War 
reaction against communism. The cumulative effect of these reinterpretations has 
been to promote a conservative understanding of sovereignty, enabling the estab-
lishment to preserve the political status quo for its own benefit. The national sov-
ereignty theory is the culmination point of this evolution. This theory is a myth, 
however, which denies historical contingency by projecting one specific concep-
tion of sovereignty back in time. Not only is the result historically and juridically 
inaccurate but it also obscures the rich and nuanced debates on sovereignty in 
Belgian constitutional doctrine as they developed over almost two centuries. We 
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conclude by reconnecting our understanding of sovereignty to these historical 
struggles, and by asking what lessons we can draw from them in light of modern 
concerns about democracy such as the rise of populism and the demand for more 
active citizen involvement. 
The early Belgian era (1831–1839) 
The early Belgian period was characterised by political unionism: the two major 
political factions of liberals and Catholics – which later developed into regu-
lar political parties – continued the political alliance forged during the Belgian 
Revolution. The threat of an external enemy endured, as the Dutch king did not 
accept the peace treaty with Belgium until 1839. Despite mounting ideologi-
cal tension between both factions, this resulted in internal political cohesion. A 
conservative tendency was clearly present in Belgian politics: in both the Catholic 
and liberal movements, the progressive wings lost prominence in favour of their 
more ‘social-conservative’ counterparts. Radical democrats, who had not wavered 
in their claims for a republican and more democratic government, were gradually 
sidelined (Witte, 2020). This tendency was reinforced by the policies of King 
Leopold I, who held restrictive views on political participation and defended a 
strong royal power, as well as by the ambitions of the Church to regain its grip 
on the clergy (Velaers, 2019, pp. 443–444; Viaene, 2001, pp. 148–149; Witte, 
2020, pp. 180, 224–232, 344–345). 
Given the prevalent political unionism, there was little need for explicit doctri-
nal statements on sovereignty. The early constitutional handbooks and commen-
taries remain very brief on the subject. They mainly point to a negative definition 
of sovereignty, interpreting article 25 of the Constitution (now article 33) as the 
negation of royal or divine sovereignty. There are no traces of an identification of 
article 25 with (representative) national sovereignty as opposed to (direct) popu-
lar sovereignty. The oldest existing handbooks trace the article back to the notion 
of sovereignty in the French Constitution of 1791, which they explained as popu-
lar sovereignty in a represented form (S.A., 1831, p. 40; Plaisant, 1832, p. vi; 
Rogron, 1836, p. i). There did seem to be agreement, however, on the fact that 
the National Congress had opted for a representative regime rather than direct 
democracy, though no link was made between this choice and the issue of sover-
eignty (see Chapter 9 on the relation between representation and sovereignty). 
The era of national consolidation and the confessional 
feuds (1839–1893) 
The political struggle between liberals and Catholics 
As the Belgian state gained stability after the peace treaty with Holland in 1839, 
internal political conflicts resurfaced. The end of unionism signalled a return to 
the liberal versus Catholic opposition which had dominated the period prior to 
the Belgian Revolution. A second major line of ideological division surfaced in 
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Catholics. In the context of these evolutions, a wide array of interpretations con-
cerning sovereignty emerged – though conservative understandings remained 
dominant. What is clear, however, is that today’s conceptual differentiation 
between national and popular sovereignty was not yet present during this period. 
To be sure, a few individual authors differentiated national and popular sov-
ereignty. In France, the political economist Simonde de Sismondi was the first 
to introduce a differentiation in his Études sur les constitutions des peuples libres
of 1836 (Simonde de Sismondi, 1836). Concerned with the idea of an absolute 
‘general will’ upon which political power rested, Sismondi believed unrestrained 
popular sovereignty to be illegitimate. The general will resulted from a concili-
ation of, or transaction between, the individual wills. Thus, Sismondi came to 
affirm that sovereignty did not belong to the absolute and indivisible people, 
but to the nation as “plural totality” (Simonde de Sismondi, 1836, p. 66 f. On 
this theme in Sismondi’s work, see also Paulet-Grandguillot, 2010). In Belgium, 
Heinrich Ahrens was the first to make the distinction in his Cours de droit naturel 
ou de philosophie du droit (Ahrens, 1892, orig. 1838). Ahrens, a native German, 
was a follower of Karl Krause’s organ theory. He saw the nation as a holistic entity 
spanning generations. National sovereignty implied that the unified and inter-
nally organised nation acted through its constituted organs. Popular sovereignty, 
on the other hand, was a product of social atomism. Based on the imperative 
mandate and on the universal franchise, it came down to a ‘sovereignty of the 
number’. Ahrens theory, however, had little influence on Belgian doctrine.1 
The lack of consensus and the discourse of the ancient constitutions 
A uniform vision on sovereignty did not develop before the end of the nine-
teenth century, as the diversity of opinions during this time period shows. Article 
25 continued to be explained as the negation of royal or divine sovereignty. 
Furthermore, most scholars explained sovereignty as omnipotence (Britz, 1865, 
pp. 57–58; Destriveaux, 1849, pp. 30–34, 40–46; Stecher, 1851, pp. 18–19; 
Thonissen, 1844, pp. 103–104; Van Hoorebeke, 1848, p. 16; Wyvekens, 1854, 
p. 9).2 Others still associated article 25 with the idea of mixed government 
(Docquier, 1856, p. 10; Masson and Wiliquet, 1885, p. 39; Wyvekens, 1854, pp. 
11, 14–15). Despite the divergence of interpretations, a specific narrative per-
taining to the Constitution dominated in the middle of the nineteenth century: 
that of the ancient constitutions (Deseure, 2016a; Marteel, 2006). It was gener-
ally believed that the ancient constitutions of the former Southern Netherlands 
had their origin in a reciprocal social contract with the monarch. Depicting the 
1 The limited influence of Ahrens’s theory can be found in the writings of his student and suc-
cessor at the philosophy chair of the University of Brussels, Guillaume Tiberghien (Tiberghien, 
1844; 1875). 
2 A more Rousseauian version of inalienable yet unrestricted sovereignty was given in De Fooz 
(1859, pp. 30–31, 49–50, 57–58). 
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Constitution as a ‘national product’ was politically useful, since the emphasis on 
authenticity and continuity was a way to legitimise the country’s independence 
(Delbecke, 2007, pp. 373, 389; Deseure, 2016a; Raxhon, 1989, pp. 32–35). 
At the same time, this discourse was deployed as a propaganda tool by the 
different political parties. Liberals stressed that popular sovereignty underlaid 
the social contract, as well as individual liberties (Faider, 1842, pp. 146, 155; 
Kupfferschlaeger, 1871, pp. 1524–1541; Waille, 1838, pp. 150–151). They 
focused on the history of the cities which had functioned as liberal bastions 
against Catholic hegemony (Polain, 1844, p. 286; Vandenpeereboom, 1873, pp. 
256–257). For Catholic writers, meanwhile, the ancient constitutions allowed 
them to deny that the origin of the modern liberties lay in the French Revolution. 
Especially after the revolutions of 1848, they argued that the constitutional liber-
ties were of national origin and derived from the liberties guaranteed under the 
ancient constitutions by stable, traditional, and Catholic institutions. In the same 
move, the ancient constitutions served to disavow popular sovereignty, social 
equality, and universal suffrage. The Belgian Revolution, and the Constitution 
it produced, was not based on the principle of popular sovereignty, nor on the 
modern liberties of the French Revolution. It resulted from William I’s breach 
of Catholic values and traditions, which the ancient constitutions embodied (De 
Gerlache, 1852, pp. 65–73; Van Den Broeck, 1859, pp. 4–5). Prompted by 
French expansionism under Napoleon III, this narrative of ancient constitution-
alism enjoyed a renewed wave of popularity in the 1870s. Although it became 
less prominent afterwards, it remained an important element in constitutional law 
handbooks well into the twentieth century. 
The elitist liberal interpretation of sovereignty and the rise of the 
democratic movement 
Aside from the discourse of the ancient constitution, the middle of the nine-
teenth century was marked by the struggle between the democratic emancipatory 
movement and the socially conservative establishment. Despite the disagreement 
on the details of the concept of sovereignty in Belgian doctrine, there did exist a 
consensus that it was to be interpreted in a social-conservative and elitist manner. 
Catholics and liberals alike made sure to consolidate their political position in 
response to the challenge coming from the new democratic movements. Whereas 
the Catholics openly attacked the idea of popular sovereignty and the belief that 
it entailed universal suffrage, this was much more difficult for the liberals, for 
whom this principle continued to be the source of state legitimacy. However, 
from 1850 on, French Doctrinaire ideas slowly made their way into liberal cir-
cles. The liberal politician Ernest Vandenpeereboom was the first to explicitly 
promote Doctrinaire liberalism in the Belgian context. In a typically Doctrinaire 
manner, he explained article 25 as an expression of the sovereignty of reason. 
Referring to the French Doctrinaire frontman François Guizot, he argued that 
capacity was the basis upon which suffrage restrictions were reasonably permitted. 
Vandenpeereboom believed that the Belgian constituent assembly of 1830–1831 
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had followed this point of view “in the name of reason, as well as in the name 
of doctrine” (Vandenpeereboom, 1856, pp. 25–26 with reference to Guizot, 
Histoire, II, lesson XV, pp. 301–304). However, he did not yet differentiate pop-
ular from national sovereignty. 
In contrast to the ideas of these Doctrinaires, who disconnected the will of 
the electors from the will of the representatives, a number of liberals and liberal 
Catholics stressed the importance of a ‘reflexive’ relationship between the consti-
tuted powers and the people or the electors. According to these scholars, the leg-
islative chambers were certainly not alone in the exercise of sovereignty. Despite 
the rejection of the imperative mandate, the electorate was always in a position 
to judge the actions of the legislator (Bivort, 1849, pp. 29, 34; Thonissen, 1844, 
p. 167; Verhaegen, 1859, pp. 100–102). Alongside this, a minority of progres-
sive liberals promoted the idea of enlarging the censitary suffrage to a suffrage 
based on capacity. Rejecting the elitism of French Doctrinaire liberalism, they 
supported the idea of a gradual democratisation of the political system as human 
reason progressed. Education was the obvious road towards enlightenment and, 
as a result, political emancipation (Stecher, 1851, pp. 17, 31; Tempels, 1873, 
pp. 440–441; Voituron, 1876; 1878, pp. 1–4). Around the same time, a new 
movement emerged in Catholic circles which tried to strike a connection with the 
social movements. Competing with liberal and social democratic movements and 
driven to a certain extent by strategic considerations, this Christian-democratic 
movement tried to reconvert and to redirect a part of the masses to its cause 
(Witte, 2007, p. 10; 2003). 
The call for democratic reform and the emergence of the 
national sovereignty doctrine (1893–1921) 
The constitutional reform of 1893 
The elitist theories that eventually came to dominate the Belgian understand-
ing of sovereignty first appeared in the debates on the reform and improvement 
of the representative system that took place at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury (François, 1985, pp. 573–574). Movements for democratic emancipation 
prompted anxiety about the preservation of the parliamentary system (De Smaele, 
2002, pp. 114–121), while the diversity of the social body – which was not 
reflected in parliament – increasingly became an object of attention for reformers 
and politicians (De Smaele, 1999, pp. 345–346). 
The Belgian Workers’ Party (BWP), founded in 1885, quickly became a pow-
erful voice in the struggle for the social betterment and political representation 
of the working class. The introduction of universal suffrage was its single most 
important demand (Puissant, 2007, pp. 98–99; 2004; Reynebeau, 2009, pp. 
94–95; Stengers, 2004, p. 253). The BWP saw universal suffrage as a means to 
defend the interests of the groups it represented, as opposed to the general inter-
est. Such a definition of the representative mandate ran counter to the ‘functional’ 
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doctrine, according to whom the vote is not an individual right but rather a func-
tion to appoint those best placed to reveal the will of the nation as a whole. 
A combination of social unrest, mass demonstrations, and general strikes 
finally convinced the established powers that constitutional reform, including an 
extension of suffrage of some kind, was no longer avoidable. The public debate 
in the early 1890s on constitutional reform focused on three issues, notably: the 
representation of interests, proportional representation, and the introduction of 
the referendum (De Smaele, 1999; Röttger, 2005; Velaers, 2007). It is in these 
debates – and those on the referendum in particular – that a novel conception of 
national sovereignty surfaced for the first time. 
Universal suffrage, as demanded by the social democratic movement, quickly 
proved to be unattainable. Since the social democrats were not yet represented in 
parliament, a compromise needed to be found between Catholics and liberals and 
between the various tendencies within these parties. Different forms of censitary 
suffrage, capacitary suffrage, and corporative representation were considered. A 
compromise was finally found around the proposal of Albert Nyssens, a profes-
sor of law at the Catholic University of Leuven and later minister of industry. 
Nyssens came up with ‘multiple universal suffrage’: one vote for each adult male, 
supplemented with one or two additional votes depending on wealth and capac-
ity. Nyssens’ proposal was not purely informed by strategic considerations. He 
believed the gradual enlargement of suffrage to be a logical and inevitable out-
come of the constitution’s choice for a representative regime based on popular 
sovereignty (Nyssens, 1890, p. 8). 
The reform of voting rights was only one of several avenues which were 
explored in order to improve the representative system. Another one was the 
introduction of the referendum. The initiative in this regard was taken by King 
Leopold II. Just like the Catholic establishment, the king had consented to open 
the procedure for constitutional reform in order to avoid serious social upheaval.3 
He expected the enlargement of suffrage to result in a reinforcement of parlia-
mentary authority at the expense of the executive power. At the same time, he 
feared the breakthrough of socialism in parliament. As he described his own role 
as that of the “truthful guardian and protector” of the interest of the state,4 he 
sought to strengthen the royal powers as a way to guarantee the stability of the 
state institutions (Senelle et al., 2004, p. 30). His preferred option for doing so 
was the introduction of a referendum on royal initiative, which would have ena-
bled the king to bypass and overrule a parliamentary majority if necessary (Orban, 
1908, p. 514; Witte et al., 2003, p. 399). 
The proponents of this proposal (e.g. the Catholic prime minister Auguste 
Beernaert, doctrinal liberals like Emile Banning, and progressive liberals like Emile 
de Laveleye and Paul Janson) argued that the balance between the different state 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this procedure and its connection to the issue of constituent 
power, see Chapter 9. 
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powers had been thrown out of whack by the increase in parliamentary authority. 
According to them, parliamentary omnipotence was not what the framers had 
envisaged. Such a regime reduced all the guarantees for the protection of indi-
vidual rights and undermined the institutions which the framers had set up to this 
end, e.g. the monarch as neutral power, the balance of the constituted powers, 
ministerial responsibility, etc. (e.g. Banning, 1899, pp. 11, 20–27, 32–40, 50; 
De Laveleye, 1897, p. 394). So, a new balance had to be achieved. A consultative 
referendum was considered useful in this respect since it would allow the elector-
ate to settle conflicts between the chambers or between the chambers and the 
king. For the progressive liberal De Laveleye, this would allow the king to truly 
become a neutral power, as originally intended. The royal referendum would 
reactivate the royal veto, which had fallen into disuse. By consulting the nation, 
the king would be in a position to make sure that legislation reflected the real 
interests and opinion of the country: 
Or the project of law, against which popular manifestations have arisen, will 
be ratified by referendum by a majority of voters. Then the advocates of the 
sovereignty of the people will have to bend before the clearly expressed will 
of the people; or the majority rejects the project, which would prove that it 
was genuinely unpopular. In this case, it would be good that the constituted 
powers would acknowledge the opposition of the real country. 
(emphasis from the original author. De Laveleye, 
1897, p. 402) 
For Prime Minister Beernaert, the referendum was a way to moderate the demo-
cratic powers and integrate them into the political system. Although the nation 
had delegated its powers under the Constitution, he claimed that it retained the 
right to be consulted on important matters.5 Beernaert anticipated the argu-
ment of the referendum’s unconstitutionality by stressing its consultative nature. 
Additionally, he argued that the referendum would act as a useful corrective on 
the (at that time) majoritarian electoral system, where alternating liberal and 
Catholic governments were systematically reversing the measures taken by their 
predecessor. This kind of immobilisation could be prevented by consulting the 
nation in a referendum. Others, such as Catholic member of parliament Frans 
Schollaert, argued that the parliamentary right of investigation (old article 40 of 
the Constitution) provided a constitutional basis for the introduction of a con-
sultative referendum. This right followed from parliament’s legislative initiative 
and principally admitted that the legislative assembly could inform itself through 
consultation with the electorate. Similar arguments were formulated by Émile 
Dupont and Eugène Goblet d’Alviella.6 
5 Hand. Kamer 1891–1892, p. 507, 2 February 1892, Beernaert. 
6 Hand. Kamer 1892–1893, p. 1904, 13 July 1893, Schollaert; Hand. Senaat, 1892–1893, p. 
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The opponents of the referendum, in turn, argued – somewhat unsurprisingly –
that it was not compatible with the representative regime established by the
Belgian Constitution. Fierce opposition to the proposal was voiced in parliament
by the Catholic leader Charles Woeste and Doctrinaire liberals such as Walthère
Frère-Orban and Jules Bara. They rejected the referendum because it risked dis-
figuring the parliamentary system by locating power directly with the people.7 
Leopold II, meanwhile, was accused of using the referendum as an instrument to
realise his ideal of Caesarism and royal despotism. For the first time, the idea that
Belgian government was exclusively representative in nature was explicitly stated.
Frère-Orban argued in parliament that sovereignty in Belgium was therefore not
reconcilable with plebiscites.8 Moreover, he explicitly differentiated representa-
tive sovereignty from the direct, popular sovereignty desired by the progressives
and radicals: 
The Constitution […] formally condemns the sovereignty of the people, 
which you affirm. The Constitution says it is true that the Belgians are equal 
before the law and that all the powers emanate from the nation, i.e. it does 
not recognize the regime which has been called “of divine origin”. Yet, [the 
Constitution] adds […] that these powers are exercised in a manner that it 
determines. In which manner are the origin of the powers and the powers 
themselves determined? This is what the Constitution says in explicit terms. 
[…] Furthermore, she defines the powers and the manner of their exercise, 
which excludes in the most absolute way your interpretation of the sover-
eignty of the people. 
(Hand. Kamer 1892–1893, p. 1032, 23 March 
1893, Frère-Orban) 
This passage shows that Doctrinaire liberals now clearly made a distinction between
a mediated form of sovereignty, on the one hand, and an unmediated one on the
other. Showing a remarkable affinity with the French Doctrinaires, Frère-Orban
identified the first form with the “theory of the numbers”, according to which
the referendum and universal suffrage followed. He rejected this form in favour
of “the insights of reason”, which were to be found in the representative regime.9 
The ideological entente between Catholics and Doctrinaire liberals against 
direct democracy seemed complete (De Smaele, 1998, pp. 29–31; Raxhon, 
2007, pp. 37–38). Jules Van den Heuvel, a professor of public law at the Catholic 
University of Leuven and later Catholic minister of justice, published an exten-
sive refutation of the referendum and of universal suffrage. He argued against 
7 Hand. Kamer 1892–1893, p. 1036, 23 March 1893, Frère-Orban. 
8 “Le régime [représentatif] sous lequel nous vivons exclut la législation directe par le corps élec-
toral. […] L’application d’une telle mesure renverserait toute l’économie du régime représentatif 
et parlementaire” (Letter of Frère-Orban of 23 December 1891, published in L’Indépendance 
belge, ‘Le referendum royal. Une lettre de M. Frère-Orban’, 30 December 1891, no. 363). 
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the total uprooting of the constitutional system by the introduction of these 
measures, the risk of personal government by the king based on plebiscites, the 
loss of prestige and authority for the constituted powers, and the impossibility of 
consistent policy-making due to the whims of the electorate (Van Den Heuvel, 
1892; 1898). Similar arguments were advanced by the Catholic aristocrat and 
communal politician Fernand de Zerezo de Téjada (Zerezo de Téjada, 1891, esp. 
pp. 1–3, 20, 23). 
It is obvious, however, that this rejection by the established parties of direct 
citizen participation was not purely based on principle, but also on strategy. 
Woeste indicated as much when he stated that the proposed reforms went against 
the tradition and principles of the existing systems as well as against the inter-
ests of the conservative party.10 The more moderate Van den Heuvel joined this 
position, fearing that universal suffrage and the referendum would allow social 
democrats and republicans to attack the parliamentary system (Van Den Heuvel, 
1892, pp. 24–25, 161). Further government initiatives towards the introduction 
of referendums failed due to this broad opposition (Lejeune and Regnier, 1985, 
pp. 23 with references in n. 33–35; Orban, 1906, pp. 123–124). 
Fruitless attempts at further democratisation 
Several additional attempts to introduce referendums were made in the decades 
following the constitutional revision of 1893. In 1899, social democrats and pro-
gressive liberals proposed to organise a national referendum on the subject of 
the introduction of proportional representation.11 Two years later, the progres-
sive liberal Paul Janson filed a similar proposal for a national referendum on the 
introduction of universal single suffrage and proportional representation.12 In 
both cases, the progressive opposition tried to organise a referendum as a way to 
bypass the parliamentary majority blocking their proposals to change the politi-
cal system. The arguments of the 1893 debate were largely repeated, and both 
proposals were subsequently defeated in parliament.13 
The situation was different in 1919–1921, when a government of national 
unity sought to revise the Constitution as part of the country’s post-war mod-
ernisation. In 1919, the government single-handedly introduced universal male 
suffrage in the face of communist agitation and massive social disruption (and in 
direct contravention of the written Constitution). This radical move was justified 
by liberal minister Henri Jaspar (backed by the liberal constitutional scholar Paul 
Errera) through the argument that the circumstances of the war, which among 
other things prevented regular elections, had already created an unconstitutional 
political situation. Errera’s Catholic counterpart Léon Dupriez added that the 
10 Hand. Kamer 1892–1893, p. 1336, 20 May 1892, Woeste. 
11 Parl. St. Kamer 1898–1899, p. 229. 
12 Parl. St. Kamer 1900–1901, p. 192. 
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parliamentary majority of the time could no longer be said to reflect the true 
national opinion, since it had been elected before the war (Haag, 1976, p. 172). 
This debate is interesting because it suggests that, at least for some constitutional 
scholars, elections alone do not legitimise parliament. Both its composition and its 
decisions need to express the will of the nation as it exists at that moment. Among 
the measures proposed by the government of national unity was the introduction 
of a so-called référendum de partage. Under this proposal, referendums could be 
called in cases of disagreement between the chambers, when a legislative proposal 
was contested by a significant minority and when the king deemed it necessary.14 
The proposal concerned both referendums on ordinary legislation and on con-
stitutional revisions. Articles 26 and 39 of the Constitution would be amended 
to make the change possible. Remarkably article 25 (at least the first paragraph) 
remained out of the picture. This suggests that the connection between national 
sovereignty and the representative regime on the one hand, and the principle that 
“all the powers emanate from the nation”, on the other, was still not present. 
The government’s proposal, as well as four additional proposals for the revision of 
article 26, was nevertheless defeated in parliament: they (narrowly) failed to reach 
the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendments.15 
After this period, and with the introduction of universal male suffrage, interest 
in the introduction of referendums waned. Particularly in social democratic cir-
cles, the referendum had primarily been conceived as a corrective of the existing 
representative system and its exclusive nature. With the introduction of universal 
suffrage (and the earlier adoption of proportional representation in 1899), the 
socialist party was able to obtain a landslide victory in the 1919 elections. Now 
constituting a regular political party, it became less concerned with direct politi-
cal participation than it had been before, which shows once more the intimate 
connection between political strategic motives and positions on matters of con-
stitutional principle. 
The post-war era (1950–1985) 
The Royal Question and Belgium’s frst and only referendum 
As we have seen, the modern conceptual differentiation between national sov-
ereignty and popular sovereignty only came about in 1893 in the context of 
the debates on constitutional reform and the introduction of the referendum 
on the royal initiative in particular. It is important to note that for the time 
being, this conceptual opposition occupied a minority position. In most cases, 
the terms national and popular sovereignty continued to be used interchange-
ably. A sizeable number of handbooks still explained article 25 as a manifestation 
of popular sovereignty (Boon, 1940; Brants, 1937; De Hoon, 1927; De Putter, 
14 Parl. St. Kamer 1918–1919, no. 329, p. 2. 
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1944; Noterdaeme, 1956; Vauthier, 1931). The national sovereignty interpreta-
tion, however, gradually gained support over the course of the first half of the 
twentieth century (e.g. Dor and Braas, 1935, pp. 161, 157 with reference to 
Raymond Carré de Malberg; Errera, 1909, pp. 117–119; Orban, 1906, p. 276, 
with reference to Frère-Orban, 1908, pp. 3–8, 26–27; Speyer, 1927, pp. 30–33, 
45–46; Vanden Bossche, 1925, pp. 547–550), until finally becoming the domi-
nant doctrine in the aftermath of the referendum on the Royal Question which 
was held in 1950. 
The post-war period in Belgian politics was characterised by attempts at politi-
cal normalisation, as well as by a revival of Belgian patriotism. The collective 
experience of the war became embodied in the abstract ‘nation’ and the idea of 
a ‘Belgian community’, terms which became omnipresent in political discourse 
(Conway, 2012, p. 246). The interbellum scepticism towards parliamentary insti-
tutions now made way for a wholehearted celebration of democratic representa-
tive institutions. “Outside of parliamentary democracy”, Prime Minister Achiel 
Van Acker declared in 1945, “there only exists escapades, misery and perils”.16 
It is somewhat surprising therefore that Belgium’s first – and to date, only – 
national referendum was held in this context. 
The political crisis which led to the organisation of this referendum erupted in 
1945 with a power struggle between parliament, which was dominated at the time 
by the social democrats, and King Leopold III, who was supported by the right-
wing Catholics. When the king surrendered to Germany in May 1940 (becoming 
a German prisoner of war for the remainder of the conflict), the government 
declared him unable to govern. Shortly after Leopold III’s liberation, discussion 
arose about his return to power. The revelation of his sympathies for Hitler as 
well as his stubbornness and autocratic attitude only worsened his relations with 
the social democrats, who promptly passed legislation to make sure that the deci-
sion on the king’s return remained exclusively with parliament (Gérard-Libois 
and Gotovitch, 1983, p. 25). In response, Leopold toyed with the idea of a refer-
endum in order to circumvent parliament. Intent on electoral gain, the Catholics 
publicly supported this idea. Their strategy paid off, and having attained a par-
liamentary majority, they could now impose the organisation of a referendum 
(Theunissen, 1984, pp. 27–28). A majority now considered the organization of 
a referendum without altering the Constitution possible, but on the conditions 
that it would remain an exceptional, one-time event and that the result of the 
referendum could not bind parliament. One month later, on 12 March 1950, 
the electorate was asked whether “King Leopold III should retake the exercise of 
his constitutional powers”. The referendum revealed deep linguistic and regional 
disagreements within the country.17 The king and the Catholic majority in parlia-
ment nevertheless interpreted the result as the ‘will of the majority’, and thereby 
16 As cited in Conway (2012, p. 251). 
17 Of the Flemish population, 72% voted for the king’s return, whereas in Wallonia and in Brus-
sels the return only received 42% and 48% of the votes, respectively. 
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as the national will. However, when they made preparations for the king’s return, 
deadly riots broke out. Revolution and civil war now threatened the government, 
and the king was compelled to step down on 16 July 1951 in favour of his son, 
Baudouin (Senelle et al., 2004, pp. 120–121). 
Very quickly, the impact of the Royal Question became apparent in Belgian 
legal scholarship. Leopold III’s inclination towards autocratic governance, if need 
be with the direct support of the electorate, urged several constitutional schol-
ars to reach back to the 1891–1893 arguments against the plebiscitary monar-
chy. However, whereas they were initially concerned with the limitation of royal 
power, their attention would shift in the light of the emergent communist threat. 
Gradually, the legal scholarship would come to associate national sovereignty 
with Western democracies, which they contrasted with the popular sovereignty 
defended by Marxist regimes (cf. infra). 
The main protagonists in this shift were the professors of constitutional law 
André Mast (at the University of Ghent) and Pierre Wigny (at the Catholic 
universities of Leuven and Namur). The impact of the crisis on constitutional 
thought was already noticeable a few months after the referendum, when Mast 
published his ‘Overview of constitutional law’. In this handbook, Mast made a 
sharp distinction between national and popular sovereignty, which he associated 
with representative and direct democracy, respectively (Mast, 1950, pp. 66–67). 
According to him, the Belgian National Congress had deliberately opted for 
national sovereignty. This meant that sovereignty resided in the complex, intan-
gible, and transgenerational nation. For Mast, it was precisely this abstraction 
that enabled a democratic regime to impose limits on, and to prevent abuses by, 
accidental majorities. The counter-image to this view of democracy was provided 
by what Mast termed ‘Rousseauian’ democracy, that is, popular sovereignty, 
where sovereignty belonged to the mass of individuals. Surprisingly, Mast con-
cluded that this regime did not exclude representation. Nor did national sover-
eignty necessarily entail representative government (Mast, 1950, p. 69; 1953, p. 
74). For Mast, popular sovereignty rather meant that sovereignty became per-
sonified in the representative assembly and more specifically in the momentary 
parliamentary majority. Since the parliamentary majority represented the people’s 
will, no checks or balances could limit its powers (Mast, 1950, pp. 66–67). This 
was Mast’s main critique of popular sovereignty. Consequently, for Mast, popu-
lar sovereignty was not so much a problem of direct democracy as a problem 
of unchecked parliamentary power. In fact, Mast’s critique seems to have been 
directed mainly against any governmental institution – whether it be the king or 
parliament – which tried to impose its will through the direct intervention of the 
electorate. The fear of a plebiscitary monarchy, in particular, seems to have been 
a concern for Mast.18 
18 Especially Mast’s reference to Charles Woeste’s views on sovereignty (instead of references 
to the constitutional debates of 1830–1831) catch the eye, as they were explicitly directed 
against the possibility of a plebiscitary monarchy (Mast, 1950, pp. 82, 84). 
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Mast’s contemporary colleague Wigny further developed the national sov-
ereignty doctrine. Just like Mast, Wigny dismissed popular sovereignty. In his 
view, a Rousseauian interpretation of popular sovereignty attributed a fraction 
of the highest power to all citizens. As a result, popular sovereignty entailed 
direct or semi-direct democracy with an imperative mandate for the representa-
tives (Wigny, 1952, p. 224). Wigny contrasted this with national sovereignty, 
where power lies with the nation, “considered in its indivisible and global con-
sistence” (Wigny, 1952, p. 225). Wigny found support for the Belgian case in 
Carré de Malberg’s organ theory, which asserted that “far from presupposing 
a pre-existing will, the organ establishes this will and this juridical person [the 
nation]” (Carré de Malberg, 1922, p. 228). This was the system Wigny recog-
nised in the Belgian Constitution’s sovereignty clause, and which he attributed 
to the framers. 
Anticommunism and the shift in the conception of sovereignty 
After the Royal Question, the views of both men gradually shifted in response 
to changing political circumstances. As Olga Bashkina recently observed, the 
Belgian sovereignty debate became influenced by growing international ten-
sions as the world stage became divided between the two geo-political spheres 
of Western democracies and the communist Soviet Union (Bashkina, 2018, pp. 
162–163). The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 resulted in a national 
anti-communist campaign in Belgium, led by the Catholic party (Gerard, 2016, 
p. 59). This Cold War context also affected the understanding of sovereignty as 
legal scholars increasingly sharpened the contrast between national and popular 
sovereignty, eventually resulting in two antagonistic conceptions of sovereignty. 
Carré de Malberg’s binary conception of national and popular sovereignty proved 
particularly useful to this end (Bashkina, 2018, p. 163). 
While Mast had first identified popular sovereignty with unconstrained par-
liamentary power, during the 1960s he gradually came to associate the term 
with the totalitarian pseudo-democracies of the Soviet regime (Bashkina, 2018, 
p. 163). According to Mast, a “classical democracy” built on national sover-
eignty entailed respect for individual rights and constitutional limitations to the 
exercise of state power. On the other hand, a “popular democracy”, based on a 
Rousseauian understanding of popular sovereignty and on the Marxist ideal of a 
classless society, paid exclusive homage to the absolute authority of “the People”. 
The latter knew no limits and inevitably led to the usurpation of state power and 
eventually to dictatorship (Mast, 1981, pp. 22–24; 1967, pp. 21–22). 
Similarly, Pierre Wigny gradually complemented his distinction between 
national and popular sovereignty with an anti-communist interpretation of these 
concepts. Using a comparable terminology to Mast, Wigny opposed Western 
“classical democracies” to communist “popular democracies” (Wigny, 1956, pp. 
11–13). Only the former provided true government by the people and for the 
people, thereby securing the plurality of opinions under permanent control of the 
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dictatorship in French Jacobin fashion and on the basis of Rousseauian principles 
(Wigny, 1973, p. 41). Just like Mast, Wigny now wielded national sovereignty as 
an instrument to denounce the theoretical legitimation of communist regimes.19 
Even though these eminent constitutional scholars managed to set the stand-
ard in Belgium on the notion of sovereignty for the second half of the twenti-
eth century, it took quite some time before their views achieved the status of a 
majority consensus. Several legal scholars continued to use national and popular 
sovereignty interchangeably, or refused to distinguish between both interpreta-
tions (De Meyer, 1982; Vliebergh, 1973). In time, however, these viewpoints 
became a minority. The discussion came to a decisive end with a 1985 opinion 
issued by the Council of State, which settled the national sovereignty doctrine 
as the standard for the next decades.20 Additionally, it also permanently settled 
the question of the constitutionality of referendums. From that point on, a large 
consensus existed among legal scholars that referendums were incompatible with 
the existing constitutional structure and that in order to introduce them a consti-
tutional revision was required. Importantly, however, while the opinion became 
one of the most important legal sources in support of the national sovereignty 
doctrine, it omitted any reference to the circumstances (the Royal Question and 
anti-communist sentiment) which had helped to shape it. Later handbooks too 
omitted this aspect of history, further decontextualising the concept of national 
sovereignty and (wrongly) attributing it to the framers. 
The contemporary debate (the 2000s onwards) 
The 1985 opinion handed down by the Council of State thus temporarily closed
the legal debate on sovereignty and referendums. Contemporary legal doctrine
acknowledged the Council’s point of view (Alen, 2000, p. 73; Delpérée, 2000,
p. 163; Geudens, 2000; Rimanque, 1999, pp. 100–101; Uyttendaele, 1994;
Velaers, 2001, p. 165; Velu, 1986). This did not mean, however, that the ques-
tion of the referendum disappeared from the political agenda. On numerous
occasions over the decades following the Council’s decision, new efforts were
made to introduce referendums. In the meantime, a series of state reforms trans-
formed Belgium from a unitary state into a federal one, consisting of three terri-
torial regions and three linguistic communities. Most often, the proposals for the
introduction of referendums were not intended to alter the democratic system
in a durable way, but rather concerned ad hoc specific issues that were politi-
cally contentious at that time, such as European integration or Belgian federal-
ism (Velaers, 2019). Several of these proposals gave the Council of State the
19 This corresponded with contemporary actions of his political party, which tried to silence 
the national communist movements through legal channels. See e.g. Kwanten (2001, pp. 
424–427). 
20 R.v.St., afd. Wetgeving, adviezen van 15 mei 1985, Parl. St. Kamer, 1983–1984, 783/2. See 
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opportunity to repeat its jurisprudence: there exists a tension between the rep-
resentative nature of the Belgian Constitution and the direct democratic nature
of referendums; and in any case, the referendum cannot be introduced without
explicit constitutional basis. 
Perhaps the most serious attempt (apart from the post–First World War 
debates) to incorporate referendums into the Belgian Constitution came in the 
early 2000s, with the formation of a government coalition between liberal, social 
democratic, and green parties. A notable aspect of this coalition’s programme 
was the stated aim of renewing and deepening Belgian democracy, most obvi-
ously through ‘direct democratic’ instruments such as referendums or popular 
initiatives. While this proposal generated much discussion and disagreement, 
there was a widespread consensus among legislators and experts alike that intro-
ducing referendums necessitated a constitutional amendment, thus cementing 
even further the Council of State’s position. Disagreement nevertheless existed 
as to whether non-binding referendums also required an explicit constitutional 
basis. Part of the legal profession, especially scholars upholding a living constitu-
tionalism approach to the interpretation of the sovereignty clause, took a scepti-
cal stance (e.g. Bourgaux, 2015; De Witte, 2003, pp. 352–353; Lejeune and 
Regnier, 1985, pp. 31–32; Popelier, 2004, pp. 118–123; Vande Lanotte et al., 
2015, pp. 208–212). In the end, however, this effort to introduce referendums – 
like all the ones before it – failed. 
The next important development occurred in 2014, when democratic reform 
was one of the topics of Belgium’s Sixth State Reform. As part of the eventual 
compromise, a new article 39 bis was inserted into the Constitution. This article 
created a constitutional basis for non-binding referendums, though exclusively at 
the level of the regions. The possibility of also holding referendums at the federal 
level was considered a step too far as it continued to evoke strong fears that this 
would pit Belgium’s different linguistic communities against each other. Thus, 
the referendum on the Royal Question, as well as the memory of the conflicts 
it generated, continued to cast their shadow on constitutional debates. Yet, for 
the sovereignty debate, the adoption of article 39 bis nonetheless constituted 
an important evolution, since the inclusion of this provision in the Constitution 
shows that parliament did not consider the national sovereignty doctrine – which 
continues to be the majority position in legal thought – a sufficient reason to 
refrain from giving referendums a place within the Belgian Constitution. Unlike 
during the pre-war constitutional debates, in 2014, the sovereignty issue did not 
feature in the parliamentary discussions, which focused mostly on technical issues –
such as which policy issues should be placed beyond the reach of the referen-
dum.21 But the impact of article 39 bis should not be overstated either. The 
article as such has little in the way of specific legal consequences, since it merely 
provides the possibility for the regions to start using referendums. It is up to each 
region to decide whether or not to make use of this possibility. So far, only the 
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region of Wallonia has adopted the necessary enabling legislation to do so, but as 
of yet no referendums have taken place under this law.22 
The value of sovereignty today 
While the practical impact of the national sovereignty doctrine may have some-
what lessened in light of these constitutional developments, it continues to hold 
a strong influence over the legal thinking on democracy in Belgium. In gen-
eral, legal scholars and practitioners remain hostile to active citizen involvement 
and see participation and representation as polar opposites. Contemporary legal 
handbooks continue to present the choice as one between national and popular 
sovereignty, the former synonymous with representation and the latter with par-
ticipation, with the Belgian Constitution clearly falling on the side of the former 
(e.g. De Schepper, 2018, pp. 14–18; Keunen and Bijnens, 2017; Schram, 2015, 
p. 110). As the previous discussion has shown, to present these concepts in this 
way is highly misleading and strips them of their historical context. Throughout 
the constitutional history of Belgium, the concept of sovereignty has been used 
to highlight different distinctions, often in service of the political needs of that 
specific moment: reason versus mob rule, parliamentarism versus monarchical 
plebiscitarianism, liberal versus Marxist democracy. By stripping the national sov-
ereignty doctrine of this context and the historical struggles in which it arose, its 
elitist consequences are legitimised. It presents the theory as an objective, origi-
nalist reading of the Constitution rather than as a political instrument which was 
used at several stages in Belgium’s political history to deny new democratic rights. 
Strangely, even legal scholars and practitioners who now question the historicity 
of the classic distinction still refuse to dismiss it entirely and eventually revert back 
to it by arguing that constitutional practice has corroborated the national sover-
eignty doctrine – thus switching between originalism and living constitutionalism 
(e.g. Alen, 2015, pp. 7, 44; Velaers, 2019, pp. 6–7). 
These elitist consequences become especially obvious when we contrast the 
Council of State’s view on representation with recent theories of representa-
tion. An important argument used by the Council to defend the incompatibility 
between direct participation and representation is the fact that referendums could 
possibly generate discordance between the will of the population as expressed 
directly in a referendum and the will of the population as expressed in parliament. 
However, in contrast to what is argued by the Council of State, a representative 
system does not require the “complete conformity between the will of the citi-
zens and their representatives”.23 Contemporary theorists of representation, such 
as Nadia Urbinati, have emphasised how the unbridgeable distance between rep-
resentatives and citizens is crucial for democracy’s proper functioning. It is this 
distance which creates the space for critical reflection on the part of citizens and 
22 See Chapter 12 for a more detailed discussion of the Walloon referendum legislation. 
23 R.v.St., afd. Wetgeving, adviezen van 15 mei 1985, Parl. St. Kamer, 1983–1984, 783/2. 
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enables them to exercise democratic control on the use of state power (Urbinati, 
2006). Members of parliament should therefore not be presumed “iuris et de 
iure” to represent the will of the people, as the Council of State argues. Rather, 
the opposite is true. Michael Saward rightly states that the possibility to contest 
any claim to represent someone or something is the essence of democratic repre-
sentation (Saward, 2010). A representative’s authority is best protected, not by 
hiding the disagreements between elected representatives and their constituents 
behind juridical abstractions such as the idea of the ‘nation’, but rather by recog-
nising the inevitable gap that separates representatives from the represented. One 
way to recognise this gap is by providing citizens with tools that allow them to 
enter into a dialogue with representatives and which give them the feeling that 
their perspective has been taken into account. 
From a cursory glance, this looks like a conflict between a strictly trustee-based 
view of representation and more contemporary approaches to representation. 
However, when seen in light of the historical struggles which shaped the sover-
eignty debate in Belgium, it becomes clear that these tensions were part of the 
debate since the beginning. The idea that representation cannot exist in isolation 
but needs to be connected to the broader realm of public opinion has always been 
present in Belgian constitutional doctrine. By incorporating the lessons of these 
struggles in our understanding of sovereignty, it thus becomes possible to gain a 
richer, more nuanced understanding of this concept which is fit for modern times 
and transcends the stale distinction between popular and national sovereignty. 
Before concluding, we would like to highlight two particular lessons which 
appear especially instructive in light of current concerns about democracy. The 
first is that sovereignty entails a negative aspect. The negative aspect of sovereignty 
implies that no political actor, be it in the person of the king or even parliament 
itself, can legitimately claim to embody the nation or the people as a whole. This, 
as we saw, was one of the purposes attributed to the sovereignty clause by the 
framers of the Belgian Constitution. Yet, it is a lesson worth relearning given the 
rise – in several Western democracies – of populism, the core premise of which is 
precisely its claim to embody the ‘will of the people’ (Mudde, 2017; Rummens, 
2017). Though the national sovereignty doctrine and populism hold different 
conceptions of state power, legitimacy, and representation, they are aligned on 
one crucial point which makes the national sovereignty doctrine vulnerable to 
being instrumentalised by a populist majority in parliament: they both deny the 
gap that exists between representatives and the represented. In populism, the will 
of the people is said to exist independently from its representation in politics. 
However, since the people is conceptualised as a homogeneous whole speaking 
with one voice, its will can be embodied by the populist party or leader itself, 
which is therefore seen as the only legitimate representative of the people (Arditi, 
2003; Urbinati, 2014, p. 113). In contrast, the national sovereignty doctrine 
denies that there is any sort of pre-existing will of the people. Rather, this will 
is constructed by parliament itself. Yet, there exists an irrefutable presumption 
(“iuris et de iure” in the words of the Council of State) that the will of parliament 
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must be avoided. While the national sovereignty doctrine is conscious of the fact 
that the equation between the will of the people and the will of parliament is a 
legal fiction, this matters little in practical terms: it still renders the collective will 
of the representatives incontestable for the represented. As a result, in the hands 
of a populist majority, the national sovereignty doctrine is likely to become just 
another tool to foreclose any contestation of their claims to represent the will of 
the people. In contrast, re-incorporating the negative aspect of sovereignty in our 
understanding of this concept would provide the necessary conceptual tools to 
deflect these populist claims: while a majority in parliament may exercise power in 
the name of the people, it cannot claim to constitute or embody the people itself, 
the exact meaning of which remains forever beyond the grasp of state institutions. 
A second lesson concerns the communicative aspect of sovereignty. As we saw, 
the choice for a representative system of government never implied that repre-
sentatives had to perform their representative role in isolation and unconnected 
from public opinion. While it is the task of representatives to legislate, they are 
free to consult the public when performing this task. Nor was the outcome of 
the representative process presumed to be infallible (as the national sovereignty 
doctrine assumes). As the lengthy debates around the turn of the nineteenth 
century show, the idea that the representative system sometimes needs correcting 
was very much alive. While we certainly do not have to adopt the solutions con-
templated at that time to address failures of representation, such as the referen-
dum on royal initiative, the concerns expressed in those debates remain relevant 
today. Especially in times of growing popular dissatisfaction with how democracy 
operates, it is not a far stretch to argue that a conception of sovereignty which 
emphasises the right of citizens to criticise, contest, and if need be correct the 
judgements of representatives is better suited to respond to these popular con-
cerns than a conception of sovereignty based on the presumption that the will of 
parliament is the correct and irrefutable interpretation of the popular will. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the historical development of the concept of sovereignty in
Belgian constitutional doctrine. It became clear that the theory of national sover-
eignty did not exist in 1830–1831 but only developed from the late nineteenth
century on. Nor can we speak of a unified and consistent theory, since national
sovereignty came in different forms and varieties which gradually developed in
response to specific political conflicts. We saw that popular sovereignty was treated
with hostility out of a conservative fear for social-emancipatory movements and
‘mob rule’, although a systematic differentiation with the concept of national sov-
ereignty was initially absent. Early formulations of national sovereignty appeared
from 1893 onward, in response to the threat of personal rule by the king occa-
sioned by Leopold II’s aspirations to extend his power via plebiscite. Both concerns
continued to inform the sovereignty debate in the twentieth century. Belgium’s
one-time experience with a referendum in the post-war Royal Question pro-
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sovereignty and popular sovereignty, between representative government and
direct democracy. Not long afterwards, Cold War polarisation between Western
and communist societies contributed to grafting the opposition between consti-
tutional liberalism and popular totalitarianism onto the same divide. The Council
of State’s momentous 1985 opinion thus canonised an interpretation which was
fairly recent and certainly did not originate in the constituent moment. 
In a sense, the intellectual shifts and the appropriation of specific intellectual 
frameworks (e.g. the Doctrinaires’ sovereignty of reason versus sovereignty of 
numbers, or Carré de Malberg’s national sovereignty versus popular sovereignty) 
are the natural consequence of the essentially contested nature of the concept of 
sovereignty. Yet, as the national sovereignty doctrine solidified into the majority 
position, the contested nature of the concept – and the historical conflicts which 
shaped it – became obscured. This evolution was not innocent, since it helped 
legitimise the elitist consequences of the national sovereignty doctrine (such as 
the unconstitutionality of referendums) by dressing them up as the original inten-
tion of the framers. By pulling the curtain on the national sovereignty myth and 
laying bare its political roots, this chapter aimed to re-establish the contestable 
nature of sovereignty. In particular, we showed how this context-sensitive, his-
torical approach provides a much more versatile understanding of sovereignty. 
This reading of sovereignty not only abandons the elitist view on representation 
inherited from bygone days but is also more receptive to the introduction of 
participatory elements, which we think are better adapted to deal with today’s 
democratic challenges. 
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